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THE ADDITIONAL EXPENSE TEST: A PROPOSAL
TO HELP SOLVE THE DILEMMA OF MIXED
BUSINESS AND PERSONAL EXPENSES
"The income tax laws do not profess to embody perfect economic
theory. They ignore some things that either a theorist or a business
man would take into account in determining the pecuniary condition of
the taxpayer." Mr. Justice Holmes in Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333,
335 (1929).
In computing his net income for purposes of federal taxation, the
individual taxpayer may deduct a variety of expenses under section 162
of the Internal Revenue Code, which permits "as a deduction all ordi-
nary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
in carrying on any trade or business . . . ."I The policy underpin-
ning this deduction2 reflects the traditional congressional concern that
costs of producing income should not be included in net income, i.e.,
in the amount upon which the tax is levied.' Since this policy does not
include expenditures other than the costs of producing income, "per-
sonal, living or family expenses" are generally nondeductible. 4 Yet,
all of the taxpayer's expenditures cannot be neatly categorized as either
"trade or business" or "personal" expenses, for certain expenses are in-
curred for both business and personal reasons. Due to the difficulty in
distinguishing between business and personal components, these mixed
expenses pose a serious and often vexing problem for the courts. Un-
fortunately, it is a problem which the judiciary has yet to resolve in a
logically consistent manner. However, a consistent approach is neces-
sary in order to prevent the present abuse of the tax system by those
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a).
2. A similar provision is found as early as the 1913 Act, Act of Oct. 3, 1913,
ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, and was retained in the original Internal Revenue Code
of 1939, INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 24(a)(1), 53 Stat. 16. See 4A J. MER-
TENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INco E TAXATION § 25.17, at 95 n.66 (Malone ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as J. MERTENS].
3. In the Senate debate over the wording of the original business expense deduc-
tion, see Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 11(B), 38 Stat. 114, Senator John Williams,
the floor manager of the bill, explained the business expense section as an attempt to
define net income:
The object of this bill is to tax a man's net income; that is to say, what he
has at the end of the year after deducting from his receipts his expenditures
or losses. 50 CoNG. Rnc. 3849 (1913).
4. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 262.
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taxpayers who attempt to partially finance personal expenses by mixing
such expenses with business costs and deducting them from gross in-
come pursuant to section 162.
Determining the proper deduction for mixed business-personal ex-
penses entails two questions. First, does the purpose for which the ex-
pense was incurred contain any component related to carrying on a
trade or business? Second, if a business component is present, what
proportion of the total expense is properly deductible? With respect
to these questions, the statutory law is often unclear and contradic-
tory; consequently, the task of resolving the mixed expense puzzle has
fallen on the judiciary.
The Supreme Court recently suggested the basis for such a resolu-
tion in Fausner v. Commissioner,5 a case involving a professional pilot
who was denied an income tax deduction for his commuting expenses.
Although commuting expenses are normally deemed not to have any
business purpose component,6 Fausner claimed that his commuting to
work included a business purpose because he had to carry his flight
bag and overnight bag from his home to the airport and back. Since
the transportation of these items was necessitated by his job as a pilot,
Fausner attempted to deduct the entire expense of commuting to the
airport. In disallowing any deduction, the Court reasoned that since
the taxpayer would have commuted by private automobile even if
he were not forced to transport his flight and overnight bags, the hap-
penstance of carrying the "incidentals of his occupation" did not change
the personal nature of the commuting expense. 7  Moreover, in dictum
the Court suggested a test for determining when a mixed expense con-
tains a deductible business component and the portion of that expense
which can be deducted as a business expense: "Additional expenses
may at times be incurred for transporting job-required tools and ma-
terials to and from work. Then an allocation of costs between 'per-
sonal' and 'business' expenses may be feasible."8 By allowing a partial
5. 413 U.S. 838 (1973) (per curiam).
6. See Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946), discussed in notes 18-20
infra and accompanying text.
7. 413 U.S. at 838-39. The Court said that it would not read INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 262 (no deduction for "personal, living, or family expenses"), to mean that
commuting expenses were not to be categorized as "personal" expenses merely because
the taxpayer had to carry the incidentals of his occupation. This holding is consistent
with Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(5) (1960) which says, "The taxpayer's costs of commut-
ing to his place of business or employment are personal expenses and do not qualify
as deductible expenses."
8. 413 U.S. at 839 (emphasis added). A footnote at the end of this sentence cited
Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 Cum. BuLL. 34 (musician's total transportation expenses de-
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deduction to a taxpayer who can show that a normal iiersonal expense
was increased for a business purpose, the Fausner test adequately cov-
ers the taxpayer who would have incurred the expense without
regard to its possible business purpose. However, the test has short-
comings. The Court's language, applied literally, would seem to elim-
inate the possibility of a full deduction for an expense from which both
personal and business benefits flow but which would not have been in-
curred absent the business purpose. This result is in conflict with the
existing tax laws which allow an individual to deduct all of the ex-
penses that he incurs as a condition of employment even in cases where
the employee may get substantial personal benefits from the expense.9
Furthermore, since the use of an administrative formula based on a
percentage of use as a means of proving a business purpose' ° is inap-
plicable to the commuting situation, the "additional expense" language,
as it is presented in Fausner, is not sufficiently inclusive to handle sit-
uations where such a formula would be appropriate."
Nevertheless, it is possible to use the Fausner rationale without
accepting the changes in tax law that would flow from the literal ap-
plication of its language to other mixed business-personal expense cir-
cumstances. To achieve this result, a more expansive test than the one
suggested by Fausner will be developed. Specifically, this Note pro-
poses a two-step -test which extends the Fausner rationale to resolve
many of the problems encountered in the troublesome area of mixed
expenses. 2  The first step is directed at identifying the presence of a
business component in the mixed expense and is structured to ac-
commodate factual situations beyond the situation considered in Faus-
ner.'3 The second step is devoted to an allocation of an expense be-
ductible under INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 162, where he would not use his automobile
but for the need to carry bulky musical instruments).
By citing this ruling the Court made it unclear whether it meant the "additional
expense" language to be read literally. The ruling contains no language to suggest that
the taxpayer's deduction should be limited to only an incremental portion of his trans-
portation expense. See 4A J. MERTENS § 25.96, at 391 n.97.2. See notes 24-25 infra
and accompanying text.
9. See notes 130-34 infra and accompanying text.
10. See subsections (1) (c) and (2) (c) of proposed test infra.
11. See notes 125-28 infra and accompanying text.
12. In applying the proposed test, an expense or part thereof would be presumed
to be of a personal nature and hence nondeductible, unless proved to the contrary by
the taxpayer. See Elott H. Rafferty Farms, Inc. v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 653,
656 (E.D. Mo. 1973) ("Any income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace, the
right to which the plaintiff has the burden of proving.").
13. While the Court determined that Mr. Fausner would have driven even if the
necessity of transporting his flight and overnight bags had not existed, the suggested
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tween its personal and business components and modifies, in part, the
Fausner rationale in order to facilitate administrative feasibility. 14
After describing the proposed test and demonstrating its operation by
means of a hypothetical example, the Note examines a number of dif-
ferent factual situations involving mixed expenses. It begins with the
commuting expense, discussing the law prior to Fausner and assessing
Fausner's impact on the commuting expense deduction. Next, the Note
deals with the office-at-home deduction and explains why the current
law in this area would be substantially changed by the Fausner ration-
ale if the courts extend it to that area. The application of the proposed
test to the office-at-home deduction and the way in which the result un-
der the proposed test is preferable to the result reached by a strict ap-
plication of the Fausner rationale are also discussed.. Finally, the
present status of other mixed expenses, including travel, entertainment,
and duplicative living expenses, is considered in light of the pro-
posed test.
PROPOSED TEST
The use of Fausner as a starting point for structuring a generally
applicable test is not without difficulties. The Supreme Court in
Fausner did not elaborate on what it meant by "additional expenses,"
nor did it intimate how it might apply the concept to other factual sit-
uations. Nevertheless, Fausner is the Supreme Court's most recent de-
cision interpreting section 162 as it applies -to mixed personal and bus-
iness expenses, and the Court is likely to try to make future decisions in
that area of the law at least generally consistent with the Fausner ra-
tionale. Since that rationale serves an important function in preventing
an erosion in the distinction between personal and business expenses,
it is doubtful that Fausner will be abandoned as aberrational.
At first glance, the "additional expense" test does not seem to be
an appropriate one for expansion. The apparent narrowness of the
test results from the Court's use of the same test to answer two differ-
ent questions. The test suggested in Fausner identifies the pres-
ence of a business component in a mixed expense while simultaneously
test would also encompass the opposite factual situation where the taxpayer would not
have driven but for the need to transport his tools.
14. Although a literal reading of Fausner requires a precise allocation before any
deduction would be allowed, a presumption of business motivation if a more than fifty
percent use test is met would be helpful to both the taxpayer and the Service in areas
where the problems of proof are difficult. See note 127 infra. Such a presumption
has been adopted by the regulations to determine the deductibility of entertainment fa-
cility expenses. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(a)(2) (1963). See notes 125-26 infra and ac-
companying text.
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indicating how much of the total expense can be deducted. However,
there is no reason why both questions must necessarily be answered si-
multaneously, as the analysis of mixed expenses should be clarified
and broadened to include a wider range of factual situations by hand-
ling these two questions separately. Therefore, a two-step additional
expense test is proposed to clarify the Court's reasoning and to ex-
tend its application beyond the limited facts of Fausner. The test is:
1. Identification of the Presence of an Additional Expense.
The taxpayer may show a deductible business related ex-
pense:
(a) if he would not have incurred any of the expense but
for a business purpose; or
(b) if he incurred an additional expense related exclusively
to time spent for a business purpose even if 1 he
would have incurred the basic expense for purely per-
sonal reasons (e.g., additional operating expenses as
opposed to the initial purchase price and regular main-
tenance expenses); or
(c) if the taxpayer cannot meet the but for requirement
of subsection (1) (a) under all the facts and circum-
stances, a conclusive presumption of the existence of a
business-related expense will arise if the taxpayer
proves that more than fifty percent of the time spent
in the expense-generating activity was related to a
business purpose.
2. Allocation of Additional Expenses. The taxpayer may deduct:
(a) one hundred percent of the mixed expense if he meets
the but for test under subsection (1) (a); or'0
(b) those additional expenses allocable exclusively to a
business purpose under the even if test of subsection
subsection (1) (b); and
15. A but for determination is also inherent in subsection (1) (b). The test of this
subsection could be restated: "if he would not have incurred the incremental expense
but for a business purpose." The even if expression of the test has been used to high-
light the fact that the taxpayer has conceded that the basic expense is personal. In
this case the taxpayer is only trying to get a deduction of the incremental expense.
The courts have also used the even if language. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Commissioner,
368 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2d Cir. 1966).
16. Any expenses allocable exclusively to personal purposes would be deducted
from the total expense. See example under The But For Test.
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(c) that part of the mixed expense equal to the percent-
age of time actually spent for the business purpose if
the subsection (1) (c) presumption is relied upon.17
The additional expense test can be illustrated by the following ex-
ample: the taxpayer owns a yacht which he often uses to entertain
business guests. However, he and his family also use the yacht for
pleasure cruising. During the taxable year, the expenses of the yacht
are $10,000, which includes:
Depreciation $ 6,000
Maintenance 1,000
Fuel 2,000
Other 1,000
TOTAL -_$10,000
The yacht was used sixty percent of the time for business purposes and
forty percent for personal reasons.
1. The But For Test. If taxpayer could prove that he would
not have purchased the yacht but for the need to entertain business
guests, he could deduct the total yearly depreciation on the yacht as
well as all maintenance and docking expenses for the year. The the-
oretical basis for a total deduction when the taxpayer meets the but for
test is that his motivation for incurring the expense was purely busi-
ness-related and his personal benefits were merely incidental. The to-
tal fixed expenses of the yacht, such as depreciation and basic mainte-
nance, should be deductible because the expenses would be the same
regardless of the percentage of personal use. On the other hand, any
operational expenses attributable exclusively to personal use, such as
fuel used when no business guests were present, would have to be sub-
tracted from total expenses before the deduction is taken. Business
operational expenses, of course, would be totally deductible. Assum-
ing personal fuel expenses to be $500 for the year, the amount de-
ductible under the but for test would include:
Depreciation $6,000
Maintenance 1,000
Fuel - 1,500
Other 1,000
TOTAL $9,500
The but for test must be proved under all the facts and circum-
stances. One way that the taxpayer might meet that burden of proof
17. Any expenses allocable exclusively to business or personal use would have to
be deducted from the total mixed expense before the deductible percentage is deter-
mined in subsection (2) (c). See example under The Presumption.
Vol. 1974:6361
DUKE LAW IOURNAL
would be to show that his employer required him to purchase the
yacht for business entertainment purposes and that he never owned a
yacht until his employer made him get one. This argument might
succeed under these circumstances even though the taxpayer actually
used the yacht more for personal use than for business use. On the
other hand, merely showing that the yacht was used more for business
purposes than for personal use would not necessarily meet the burden
of proof imposed by the but for test.
2. The Even If Test. If the taxpayer does not qualify under
the but for subsection, he could still claim a deduction for the expense
of fuel allocable exclusively to the time the yacht was used for enter-
taining business guests. In the above example, that would amount to
a $1,500 deduction.
3. The Presumption. Even though he does not satisfy the but for
subsection, the taxpayer does not have to settle for an even if deduction
if he uses the yacht more than fifty percent of the time for business
purposes. This "safe harbor" is proposed to allow some deduction to
the taxpayer who cannot meet the difficult but for burden of proof yet
still evidences a business motivation for the mixed expense by actually
using the yacht primarily for business related activities. Under the facts
of the example, the taxpayer could deduct sixty percent of the fixed
expenses:
Depreciation (60% of $6,000) ________$3,600
Maintenance (60% of $1,000) 600
Fuel 1,500
Other (60% of $1,000) 600
TOTAL $6,300
Although this "safe harbor," unlike the even if and but for tests,
is not precisely consistent with the "additional expense" language of
Fausner, the percentage limitation accomplishes two objectives. First,
since the taxpayer would be relying on an administratively promulgated
alternative to complete but for proof, his deduction should be limited
to the business percentage he actually proves. Second, limiting the de-
duction under the presumption serves as an incentive to the taxpayer
to prove his actual additional expenses under the first two tests in order
to get a full deduction.
COMMUTING EXPENSES
As indicated earlier, Fausner involved the deductibility of mixed
commuting expenses. Over the years the attitude of the courts and of
the Service toward the appropriateness of this type of deduction has
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changed. In the landmark case of Commissioner v. Flowers,"" the
Supreme Court succinctly categorized the general criteria for determin-
ing the deductibility of commuting expenses: "The exigencies of busi-
ness rather -than the personal conveniences and necessities of the trav-
eler must be the motivating factors."' 9  Since an employee is ostensibly
free to choose the location of his personal residence, commuting has
traditionally been deemed a purely personal expense.20 However, to
avoid the harshness of the general rule that none of a taxpayer's com-
muting expenses is deductible, a number of judicial and administrative
exceptions have been developed.21  One of these is the "tool excep-
tion," which allows the tool-carrying commuter a deduction for his
commuting expenses. The first Treasury Department statement, Reve-
nue Ruling 56-25,22 was unclear as to whether a taxpayer could
deduct any of his commuting expenses even where carrying tools in-
creased those expenses. 23 Later, Revenue Ruling 63-10024 approved
18. 326 U.S. 465 (1946). Flowers lived in Jackson, Miss., and most of the time
he worked there although his employer was located in Mobile, Ala. The Court held
that he could not deduct traveling expenses for trips between Jackson and Mobile nor
could he deduct his living expenses while in Mobile. The location of his home lacked
the relationship to his employer's business necessary to justify a deduction.
19. Id. at 474.
20. See Harold Gilberg, 55 T.C. 611 (1971), where the court stated:
If a person chooses to incur the inconvenience and increased expenses in liv-
ing far from his place of employment or from public transportation, he does
so for personal reasons, and it is therefore for personal reasons that he incurs
the additional commuting expenses. To allow a deduction for such expenses
would be to allow a deduction for personal expenses. Id. at 616-17.
Accord, cases cited in 1 CCH 1974 SmTm. FED. TAX RE'. 1350.07; Treas. Reg. §
1.262-1(b)(5) (1967) ('The taxpayer's costs of commuting to his place of business
or employment are personal expenses and do not qualify as deductible expenses
...."); Treas. Reg. § 1.62-1(g) (1965) ("Transportation expenses do not include the
cost of commuting to and from work; this cost constitutes a personal, living, or family
expense and is not deductible."); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(e) (1958) ("Commuters' fares
are not considered as business expenses and are not deductible."); Rev. Rul. 56-25,
1956-1 CuM. BULL. 152.
Treasury regulations have been considered particularly important by some courts
since the Supreme Court has held that Treasury regulations will have the effect of law
if they have been in effect for many years and apply provisions of law that have not
been amended. Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 7% 83 (1938). See also Harold Gil-
berg, 55 T.C. at 617, where the court noted that many requests had been made for
modifications of the commuting expense rule, but that the rule had generally remained
unchanged.
21. Exceptions have been made for tools, see notes 22-51 infra and accompanying
text; temporary employment situations, Harvey v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 491 (9th
Cir. 1960); Arthur Sansone, 41 T.C. 277 (1963), and two or more places of business,
Chandler v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 467 (1st Cir. 1955); Joseph H. Sherman, 16 T.C.
332 (1951).
22. 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 152.
23. Id. However, a partial deduction for the increased expenses could be implied
from the statement therein that "[tihe expenses so incurred in going to and from work
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a deduction for the full amount of the transportation expenses if the
taxpayer could show that he would not have used his automobile but
for the need to transport his employment incidentals. 2 Although
63-100 did not apply to the commuter who would have driven to work
even if he did not have to carry job-related incidentals, the Second and
Seventh Circuits were willing to find a business purpose component in
the taxpayers' commuting expenses in a similar even if situation.2"
In order to reflect the dual character of the expense, these courts al-
lowed a partial deduotion. 27 The Tax Court, however, has applied a
stricter standard and suggested that a taxpayer could only deduct any
additional expense caused by his need to transport tools, 28 thus fore-
were not increased .... " Id. This type of implication foreshadowed the Fausner
rationale.
24. 1963-1 Cum. BULL. 34.
25. Id. See, e.g., Tyne v. Commissioner, 409 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 833 (1969) (if taxpayer can prove that he would not have used his
car but for the necessity of transporting his tools, he will be entitled to deduct one
hundred percent of his transportation expenses). But cf. Neil M. Kelly, 33 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 1 64,073 (1964), where the Tax Court did not consider the practicalities of
transporting the taxpayer's flight bag and suitcase, but only considered the dominant
purpose of the trip, viz., commuting.
26. The Second Circuit in Sullivan v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir.
1966), rev'g and remanding 45 T.C. 217 (1965), established the rule that "[elven if
taxpayer would have driven to and from work had it not been necessary to transport
his tools, he ought to be allowed to deduct that portion of his reasonable driving ex-
penses which is allocable to the transportation of tools." Id. at 1008. The court sug-
gested two ways to justify the deduction: (1) the Tax Court should establish if the
taxpayer had some means of storing his tools; if so, the cost of storage would be the
maximum deduction; (2) if no storage was available, the Tax Court was to allocate
the cost of transportation between the taxpayer and his tools. Id. at 1009. On re-
mand, Sullivan was allowed a one-third deduction of his commuting expense, Lawrence
D. Sullivan, 37 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. % 68,144 (1968), affd, 69-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9448
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969).
The Seventh Circuit in Tyne v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1967),
adopted the rule laid down in Sullivan. The court recognized the difficulty of making
an allocation but doubted "that it is practically impossible to make such an allocation."
Id. at 42. After a series of decisions described in Tyne v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 913
(7th Cir. 1972), Tyne was ultimately allowed to deduct fifty percent of his commuting
expenses.
In Coker v. Commissioner, 487 F.2d 593, 594 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1130 (1974), the Second Circuit concluded that Fausner had overruled Sullivan.
See notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
27. Tyne v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 40, 42 (7th Cir. 1967); Sullivan v. Commis-
sioner, 368 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2d Cir. 1966).
28. In Robert A. Hitt, 55 T.C. 629 (1971), the Tax Court presented the rationale
for this approach by stating:
The need to transport equipment would not have burdened the taxpayer with
any additional expenses . . . . A deduction for transporting heavy, bulky,
unwieldy and cumbersome tools and equipment should be allowed only to the
extent that the transporting of such items causes the taxpayer to incur ex-
penses above and beyond those he would otherwise incur in commuting. Id.
at 623 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 1974:636
ADDITIONAL EXPENSE PEST
shadowing the Fausner rationale. These conflicting opinions pre-
sented the Supreme Court in Fausner with several reasoned analyses
from which to choose the appropriate deduction in a mixed business-
personal expense circumstance.
The Impact of Fausner on Commuting Deductions
The conflict between the Second and Seventh Circuits on the one
hand, and the Tax Court on the other was presented in the tax pro-
ceedings of Donald W. Fausner. While regularly commuting into New
York City with a flight kit and overnight bag required by his employ-
ment, Fausner was allowed a $105 deduction, which the Tax Court
found to be a reasonable portion of the 1965 transportation expenses
attributable to his tools.29 However, after moving from New York
and the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit, Fausner was confronted with
the same issue when he attempted to deduct his commuting expenses
for 1966 and 1967. Since his case was then appealable to the Fifth Cir-
cuit, the Tax Court was not constrained by the Second Circuit's "partial
deduction" approach 0 and declined to allow any deduction.31 In af-
firming the latter Tax Court decision, the Fifth Circuit noted that Faus-
ner had neither incurred additional expenses related to transporting
his tools nor established a rational basis for allocating a portion of his
expenses to the "exigencies of business. 32
This language is markedly similar to the Fausner opinion, where the Court stated that
the taxpayer might deduct any additional expenses caused by his tools, 413 U.S. 838,
839 (1973) (per curiam). See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
In fact, however, the Tax Court has been unwilling to recognize that in the com-
muting situation the taxpayer has incurred additional, deductible expenses. See, e.g.,
Thomas L. Bradley, 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 73,163 (1973); Richard W. Drake, 42
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 73,129 (1973); Samuel D. Woolsey, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
72,038 (1972); Harold Gilberg, 55 T.C. 611 (1971); John E. Scott, 40 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 71,158 (1971); Stanley E. Bailey, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 71,107 (1971);
Gregorio Castillo, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 71,087 (1971).
29. Donald W. Fausner, 55 T.C. 620 (1971). Since at the time the deduction was
claimed Fausner was a resident of New York an appeal from the Tax Court would
have been to the Second Circuit. Under the rule established in Golsen v. Commis-
sioner, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971), the Tax Court
followed the appropriate precedent in the circuit in which the Tax Court sat. In this
instance, the Tax Court found Sullivan v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir.
1966), to be controlling and therefore adopted Sullivan's "partial deduction" approach.
55 T.C. at 625-26.
30. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
31. Donald W. Fausner, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 71,277 (1971) (for tax years
1966-67). The court based its holding on the reasoning of the nearly identical case
of Robert A. Hitt, 55 T.C. 628 (1971).
32. Fausner v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 561, 563 (5th Cir.), affd per curiam, 413
U.S. 838 (1973). The court further stated:
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The Supreme Court, in a per curtain decision, resolved the conflict
,over the scope of the tool exception by affirming the Fifth Circuit's
denial of any deduction.3 3  While Fausner's forty-pound flight kit and
overnight bag did not increase his ascertainable costs, the Supreme Court
at least conceded that employment incidentals such as tools could cause
higher transportation expenses in some instances. 4 By implying that
it would, in an appropriate case, allow a deduction amounting to the
additional business-related expenses,3" the Court endorsed a more re-
strictive method of separating the business and personal components of
a mixed expense than the simple allocation method previously used by
the Second and Seventh Circuits. 6
Since Fausner was decided, the lower courts have considered the
cases of three taxpayers who claimed a deduction of their commuting
expenses. The Second Circuit in Coker v. Commissioner 3 concluded
that Fausner "clearly overruled" its policy of allowing a partial deduc-
tion to commuters who were required to transport tools.88 In apply-
ing Fausner, the court held that none of Coker's commuting costs were
deductible since he would have driven anyway and had not shown that
he had incurred any additional expenses.3 9 Similarly, in Bernard W.
Congress has determined that all taxpayers shall bear the expense of commut-
ing to and from work without receiving a deduction for that expense. This
common burden cannot be negated for a particular taxpayer by the happen-
stance that he must carry incidentals of his occupation with him. Id. (foot-
note omitted).
33. 413 U.S. at 838-39. See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
34. Id. The Court cited, as an example, Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 CuM. BULL.
34, which allowed a musician to deduct his full automobile expenses for transporting
his musical instruments between his residence and his place of employment "because
they [were] too bulky to be carried otherwise, and he would not use his automobile
on such trips except for that reason." Id.
35. 413 U.S. at 839.
Prior cases have held that two initial findings are necessary to lay the foundation
for a possible deduction of commuting expenses. First, the taxpayer must have actually
transported his tools back and forth to work. Michael DeMichele, 42 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 73,115 (1973). Second, there must be a necessity to carry the tools. Such
a necessity can be established in a number of ways. An employer might require his
employees to transport tools, John E. Scott, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1 71,158 (1971);
there might be a lack of sufficient safe storage space at work, Frank W. Coker, 41
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 72,080 (1972), afd, 480 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part on
rehearing, 487 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974); or the
employee might have a continuing need to have the incidentals readily available at all
times, Sullivan v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir. 1966).
36. See note 26 supra.
37. 487 F.2d 593 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), rev'g in part 480 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.
1973).
38. Id. at 593-94.
39. Id. at 594. This court interpreted Sullivan to mean that "a taxpayer may de-
duct from his commuting expenses an appropriate percentage allocable to the transpor-
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Mugleston ° the Tax Court denied an airline pilot's claim of a deduction
because "[it was clear that no expenses in addition to his normal
commuting costs were incurred as a result of carrying such baggage. ' 41
In the case of Thomas L. Bradley,4 2 the taxpayer tried to deduct
the expense of driving 11,038 miles to and from work; he computed
his costs at ten cents per mile.43 His computation did not show that
carrying fifty-one pounds of police equipment caused any increment in
the costs of operating his automobile. Despite his testimony that he
would use public transportation if he did not have ,to carry his equip-
ment, the court decided that the taxpayer could not use the cost of
public transportation for a basis to compute ,the incremental expense
of operating his automobile. The use of public transportation would
have been much more time-consuming and inconvenient.44  Therefore,
the court had no "normal" commuting expense which it could subtract
from the actual commuting expense to derive the additional and de-
ductible expense. This court read Fausner to say "that commuting
expenses incurred in using one's own automobile are not deductible
merely because the taxpayer carries heavy equipment with him if he
would have driven his automobile in any event." 45
This restrictive interpretation of Fausner's additional expense lan-
guage seems to exclude the possibility of using the even if test. Pos-
sibly, this expression of Fausner's holding was motivated by the Su-
preme Court's citation of Revenue Ruling 63-100.46  This citation in
the context of the Fausner case was misleading. First, 63-100 does
not specifically address the question of the deductibility of commuting
expenses when the taxpayer would have driven to work regardless of a
need to transport his tools. Under the Fausner additional expense lan-
tation of his tools." Id. at 593. Fausner does preclude a straightforward allocation
of the total expense in the even if situation. Instead the taxpayer has to identify a
particular increment of expense before he can get a deduction in this situation.
40. 42 P-H Tax CL Mem. 73,260 (1973).
41. Id. at 1187.
42. 42 P-H Tax Ct. Me. 173,163 (1973).
43. Id. at 771.
44. Id.
45. This characterization of Fausner's holding seems to exclude the possibility that
a taxpayer could prove a deductible expense by showing that carrying his tools had
caused an incremental operating cost in the even if situation. By implication, however,
this court would seem to be willing to allow Mr. Bradley some deduction if he could
have shown that he actually would have used public transportation and that it was less
expensive than his actual commuting costs. In other words, if the taxpayer could meet
the but for requirement, he would be allowed to deduct whatever additional expenses
that he could prove.
46. See notes 8 & 34 supra. The Bradley court also cited this revenue ruling,
42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 73,163, at 771 (1973).
Vol. 1974:6363
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1974:636
guage, however, a commuter who incurs a business-related commuting
expense over and above normal commuting costs47 should be able to
deduct any additional expenses incurred even though he would have
driven to work had he not been required to transport his tools. 48  For
example, a construction worker with several hundred pounds of tools
should be able to deduct something (probably a small amount) for in-
creased expenses attributable to poorer gasoline mileage and more
rapid depreciation resulting from the increased load carried.40 Second,
the reference is misleading because 63-100 seems to permit a full
deduction of commuting expenses whenever the taxpayer would not
have driven but for the need to transport his tools. However, Fausner
may be read to modify this interpretation of 63-100, because the lan-
guage of Fausner only justifies the deduction of the incremental costs
of carrying tools. Apparently, to get a full deduction under this read-
ing of Fausner, the taxpayer will have to prove that he would walk if
he did not have to carry tools. In Arnold T. Anderson,"0 a case de-
cided before Fausner, the Tax Court used such an approach. The
court computed Anderson's actual commuting expense and the expense
of a hypothetical commute without tools. Mr. Anderson was allowed
to deduct the difference between these two figures.51
47. For the determination of the presence of a deductible expense in the even if
situation, see subsection (1) (b) of the proposed test supra.
48. For the determination of the amount to deduct in the even if situation, see sub-
section (2) (b) of the proposed test supra.
49. The confusion that the Fausner Court's reference to 63-100 has caused can also
be seen in 9 CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1 8290. There it is stated that Fausner
indicates that additional expenses in a commuting situation may be deductible only if:
(1) It is necessary to use an automobile because the equipment transported is
too bulky to be otherwise carried; [and] (2) The automobile would not have
been used except to transport the equipment; [and] (3) Such expenses are
ordinary and necessary and paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or busi-
ness. Id.
The second point only covers a but for situation, while additional expenses could arise
in an even if situation as well. See 39 J. TAx. 155, 156 (1973). While the calculation
of these extra costs may be difficult, the use of estimates may be practicable. For ex-
ample, the General Motors Corporation has estimated that 400 pounds of extra weight
would decrease gasoline consumption one mile per gallon. Durham Morning Herald,
Mar. 18, 1974, at 10A, cols. 1-5.
50. 55 T.C. 756 (1971).
51. Id. at 761. Anderson's automobile expenses were $4.50 per trip (45 miles at
$ .10 per mile) and his alternative transportation expenses without his toolswere
$2.85:
8 miles roundtrip to train $ .80
railroad transportation 1.80
bus to airport .25
Total $2.85
Therefore he received a $1.65 deduction per trip since that amount represented Ander-
son's additional expenses necessitated by his tools.
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The imiact of the Fausner additional expense language also
should be felt in factual situations where commuters, under previously
valid precedent, have been denied a deduction even though the use
of an automobile was necessary to get to and from their employment.
For example, in Mary L. Roberts52 the taxpayer was a laboratory and
x-ray technician on call twenty-four hours a day, five days a week plus
alternate weekends. In deciding against Mrs. Roberts' deduction for
the use of her car as a business expense, the Tax Court cited earlier,
similarly decided, cases and noted that the use of a car "for traveling
between the taxpayer's residence and place of employment is essentially
personal in nature."5 3  To the extent that the irregular hours incident
to Mrs. Roberts' employment precluded her from utilizing less expen-
sive forms of transportation, 54 she incurred additional transportation
expenses. The Fausner rationale would seem to allow her a deduction
for these additional expenses.
THE ADDITIONAL EXPENSE TEST AND OFFICE-AT-HOME DEDUCTIONS
It has long been held that under certain circumstances a tax-
payer may deduct part or all of the expenses he incurs in maintaining
a business-related office in his home.55  Yet in recent years, the inability
to differentiate between deductible section 162 business expenses and
nondeductible section 262 personal expenses has paralleled the
Further, if the required tools necessitated the use of a truck instead of a normal
passenger car, only those excess expenses related to the truck would be deductible. See
11 Taxation for Accountants 82-83 (1973).
52. 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 71,282 (1971).
53. Id. at 71-1277. The cases cited were: Harold Gilberg, 55 T.C. 611 (1971)
(field auditor); Margaret G. Sheldon, 50 T.C. 24 (1964) (fulltime anesthesiologist);
Lenke Marot, 36 T.C. 238 (1961) (electrocardiograph operator).
54. It is also possible that her on-call status required her to get to the hospital by
a means faster than mass transit. The problem, of course, is that it may be difficult
for a court to determine whether Mrs. Roberts would have used public transportation
but for her irregular hours. Undoubtedly the burden would be on the taxpayer to prove
this point. For other decisions denying a deduction, see Bernard W. Mugleston, 42
P-H Tax CL Mem. 73,260 (1973) (no adequate public transportation between home
and airport); Thomas L. Bradley, 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. f 73,163 (1973) ("It was a
great deal more convenient for petitioner to commute by private automobile than it
would have been by use of public transportation." Id. at 73-771).
55. See, e.g., Beaudry v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1945) (lawyer who
maintained a law library at home entitled to a tax deduction for depreciation on the
furnishings); Freda W. Sandrich, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 46,082 (1946) (writer who
found it necessary to seek the seclusion of his home to do much of his work allowed
a deduction). See also Lyndol L. Young, 268 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1959); Rupert Stuart,
30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 61,156 (1961); Louis Lindauer, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 56,172
(1956).
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difficulty encountered in the commuting expense area. s  A continu-
ing controversy has resulted from the fact that the test proposed by the
Internal Revenue Service'r has not been accepted by the courts, which
instead have formulated various tests of their own in an attempt to
resolve the tension between sections 162 and 262 in the "home office"
area. After reviewing the prior law in the area, this section of the
Note will suggest that the current test-whether the home office ex-
pense is "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer in his business 6-is
inadequate to prevent the deduction of personal living expenses, and
that application of the additional expense concept would more likely
prevent the potential tax abuse inherent in an office-at-home expendi-
ture.
Development of the Office-at-Home Deduction
1. Condition of Employment Doctrine. The first test articulated
by -the courts for the office-at-home deduction was the striot "condition
of employment" doctrine. In -the 1962 case of Harold H. Davis,50 the
Tax Court denied a deduction to a university professor who used a
room above his garage to prepare lectures, grade exams, perform re-
search, and hold student conferences.60 Despite Davis' use of the
room for exclusively professional purposes and the admitted inade-
quacy of his employer-provided office, the court held that no deduction
would be allowed unless the home office was maintained as a condi-
tion of employment. 6' In a vigorous dissent, Judge Raum condemned
56. See text accompanying notes 18-54 supra. See also Crumbley, Courts Are
Changing Current Tax Climate on Office-at-Home Deduction, 31 J. TAX. 300 (1969);
Lewis, Taxes and the Home Office, 44 TAXES 653 (1966); Courts Reject Two IRS
Rules for Deducting Office-at-Home Expenses, 34 J. TAx. 46 (1971).
57. Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 CuM. BuLL. 52. See note 63 infra.
58. Stephen A. Bodzin, 60 T.C. 820, 825 (1973).
59. 38 T.C. 175 (1962). See Wolfman, Professors and the "Ordinary and Neces-
sary" Business Expense, 112 U. PA. L. RPv. 1089 (1964).
60. 38 T.C. at 177-80. Davis maintained this office primarily because he was un-
able to pursue these activities in his school office without interruption. While admit-
ting that he was not required by his employer to use his home, Davis argued that the
inadequacy of his campus office rendered his home office expenses "ordinary and nec-
essary" within the meaning of section 162.
61. Id. at 180. The court pointed out that Davis' research and writing activities
were voluntary on his part and were undertaken for the purpose of increasing his pres-
tige as a scholar. "Expenditures made to acquire reputation or learning are not ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses;" therefore the office-at-home was for the taxpay-
er's personal convenience and not deductible. Id. at 179.
The condition of employment test proposed in Davis is consistent with the tests
imposed in other areas of employee business expenses. For example, expenses for edu-
cation are deductible only if they meet the "express requirements of a taxpayer's em-
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this test and foreshadowed the subsequent liberalization of the home
office deduction. He pointed out that the statutory test requiring a de-
ductible expense to be "ordinary and necessary" meant only that the
expense must be "appropriate and helpful," rather than indispensable
and required, to the taxpayer in his trade or business.62 The Davis
case is important in the office-at-home chronology because the major-
ity's "condition of employment" doctrine and -the dissent's "appropriate
and helpful" standard set out -the divergent positions which the Service
and the courts were to take as the controversy continued. Just six
months after its victory in Davis, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 62-
18063 allowing a deduction only when the home office was required as
a condition of the taxpayer's employment.
2. Implied Condition of Employment Requirement. The courts
quickly attacked the Revenue Ruling's strict "condition of employment"
doctrine. In a factual situation very similar to Davis,64 the Tax Court
allowed an office-at-home deduction to a university professor because
his professional status depended on his ability and productivity as a
researcher and teacher, and his employer-provided office was inade-
quate for these activities.6 5 Even though the taxpayer was not re-
quired by the university to provide his own office, the court apparently
found the home office to be an implied condition of employment be-
cause it was necessary for the taxpayer to prepare lessons and research
ployer, or the requirements of applicable law or regulations, imposed as a condition
to the retention by the taxpayer of his salary, status, or employment." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-5(a)(2) (1967). See Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
Also, expenses for uniforms or special clothing are deductible only if required as a con-
dition of employment and not suitable for off-duty wear. Mimeograph 6463, 1950
CuM. BULL. 29; Rev. Rul. 70-474, 1970-2 Cum. BULL. 34. See Roth v. Commissioner,
17 T.C. 1450, 1455 (1952); Karachale, Deduction for Office-at-Home Expenses by
Employees, 50 TAXES 343 (1972).
62. 38 T.C. at 186. iSee Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933); 4A J.
MERTENS § 25.122, at 552-54. Davis not only easily met the appropriate and helpful
test, but he also had clearly segregated any personal expense from his home office ex-
pense by constructing the room specifically for use as a professional office and by using
the room exclusively for his work as a professor. 38 T.C. at 187.
63. 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 52. The revenue ruling provides that a deduction will
be allowed if: (1) as a condition of his employment, the taxpayer must be required
to provide his own space and facilities for performance of some of his duties; (2) he
must regularly use a part of his personal residence for that purpose; or (3) the em-
ployer must not provide other convenient or suitable facilities that could be used instead
of his home.
64. See notes 59-62 infra and accompanying text.
65. Clarence Peiss, 40 T.C. 78 (1963). Peiss' employer-provided office was inade-
quate because it was not separated from a research laboratory which was in constant
use by students. Id. at 83-84. See generally Lewis, Taxes and the Professor's Home
Ofice: Rulings, Cases, and Commentary, 47 Cm. B. REc. 161 (1966).
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publishable articles in order to retain his professional status."0
3. Efficiency of the Employee Test. In 1970, the Second Circuit
took a further step away from the "condition of employment" doctrine.
In Newi v. Commissioner,67 the court allowed a salesman of television
network advertising time to deduct the expenses of an office-at-home,
even though his employer provided adequate office space and equip-
ment and did not require or request him to maintain a home office.
The court's decision seems to be based on the fact that because the
taxpayer's job included watching television programming in the eve-
ning, he could not afford to miss many of the programs important to
his work which were televised during the time in which he would be
returning to his employer-provided office after dinner.68 Although the
court's reasoning could be read as another application of the existing
"implied condition of employment" requirement, 9 the significance of
the decision lies in the court's inquiry into the meaning of the "neces-
sary" requirement of section 162. In going beyond previous judicial
efforts to define "necessary," 70 the Second Circuit attempted to deter-
mine whether the home office was the most practical or best location
in which to perform the taxpayer's work.7 1  This mode of analy-
sis, which focuses on the increased efficiency or work quality pro-
duced by the office-at-home to determine the business necessity of the
66. See Rev. Rul. 63-275, 1963-2 Cum. BuLL. 85, which allows a professor to de-
duct expenses, including reasonable traveling expenses, "incurred by a professor for the
purpose of teaching, lecturing, writing and publishing in his area of competence .... "
Id. at 86. This ruling does not deal explicitly with the question of deducting the costs
of an office-at-home.
67. 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970), affg 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. [ 69,131 (1969).
See Note, Newi v. Commissioner: Home Office Deductions and Equal Treatment for
Employees, 47 IND. L. 546 (1972).
68. 432 F.2d at 1000.
69. The restrictive nature of Newi was emphasized when the Tax Court later de-
nied a deduction in Paul v. O'Connell, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1 72,171 (1972).
O'Connell was a comptroller and tax consultant who claimed he worked 24 hours per
week in his apartment, although the home office was not required by the employer and
space was always available at the company offices. Newi was distinguished because
O'Connell made no showing that his work could be done better at home or that it was
more practical to do it there. Rather, the court held his work at home was only for
his own convenience and entirely voluntary. Id. at 880. The O'Connell holding
should serve as a warning that where the taxpayer can prove no plausible reason for
his home office other than personal preference, the deduction will not be upheld.
70. Previous attempts to expand the interpretation of "necessary" beyond the condi-
tion of employment test had resulted only in the "appropriate and helpful" redefinition
(see Judge Raum's dissent in Davis, note 62 supra and accompanying text), which
merely left the courts with two new words to define.
71. "It would be hard to imagine a better method than, in the isolation of his
study-den, to view, ponder over and make notes relating to television programs." 432
F.2d at 1000.
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expense," would allow an employee some freedom of choice in how
to best perform his employment duties. 73  However, this approach
comes close to recognizing the mere convenience of the taxpayer as an
appropriate criterion for the business deduction, a criterion which has
been held to be indicative of a personal preference and, therefore, a
nondeductible personal expense. 4
The Latest Development: Stephen A. Bodzin and the Appropriate and
Helpful Standard
The most recent office-at-home test was articulated by the Tax
Court in the case of Stephen A. Bodzin,"5 decided about two months
after Fausner. The taxpayer was an I.R.S. attorney who regularly took
his work with him and completed it in his personal study,76 even
though his employer-provided office was adequate and always open for
his use. He was not required, requested, expected, or even encouraged
72. Efficiency was considered a dispositive criterion in the case of Marvin L. Die-
trich, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 71,159 (1971), where a resident physician was allowed
a deduction for a home office and library because the hospital did not provide facilities
where he could read without interruption to keep abreast of current developments in
his field. Cf. LeRoy W. Gillis, 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 11 73,096, at 424-25 (1973)
(because of the distance from the taxpayer's house to his place of business, the court
considered the efficiency promoted by the home office in upholding the deduction).
In James L. Denison, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1 71,249 (1971), a teacher was al-
lowed a deduction for his home office even though it was not required and other teach-
ers at the school were able to complete their work at the school during normal school
hours. Focusing on the possibility of better quality teaching, the court said of Deni-
son: "The method of presentation, the material to be corrected and the sincere desire
to teach the subject will distinguish the taxpayer from his fellow teachers." Id. at
1133.
Increased efficiency and work quality have not been the only criteria accepted by
the courts to determine the business validity of an expense. The danger of criminal
assault was also considered important in granting deductions in Gillis and Denison. In
Gillis the court considered the hazards of working alone at night, 42 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. If 73,096, at 424-25 (1973), and in Denison, the possibility of harm to a teacher
was found significant because the school principal had advised her to leave the school
by 4:30 p.m. 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 171,249 (1971), at 1133.
73. See Note, supra note 67, at, 557.
74. Paul v. O'Connell, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 72,171 (1972), discussed in note
69 supra.
75. 60 T.C. 820 (1973).
76. Besides his official work, the taxpayer used his study for professional reading
to keep abreast of current developments in the tax law. Id. at 822. The study was
furnished with a desk, lamps, bookcases and cabinets, and contained Bodzin's personal
tax books and periodicals. It was not used when the taxpayer entertained visitors and
for the most part was used solely by the taxpayer. Occasionally, he used the room
for purposes unrelated to his business such as payment of bills and stamp collecting.
Besides his legal materials, the room was used for storage of personal papers, his stamp
collection, and his and his wife's personal libraries. Id. at 823.
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to work after normal hours, but he thought it desirable to do so in or-
der to insure his best performance. 77 In fact, Bodzin usually brought
his extra work home with him rather than completing it at his office,
because working at home was, in his opinion, more convenient and ef-
ficient.78  Thus, he deducted part of his apartment rent as a business
expense.79 Allowing the deduction, the Tax Court held that the
proper test was whether the maintenance of the office-at-home was
"appropriate and helpful under the circumstances,"'80 the same test pro-
posed ten years earlier by Judge Raum's dissent in Davis.81 Since
Bodzin's home office was directly related to his business, it was
deemed "appropriate and helpful" and therefore a "necessary" busi-
ness expense under section 162.82
When considered in light of earlier decisions, Bodzin is unique
because the Tax Court did not inquire whether -the home office in-
creased the efficiency or work quality of the taxpayer in his business. 2
Although the facts of the case seem to indicate that these requirements
were met, 4 the court, in its formal opinion, made no such finding.
Instead, it interpreted the "appropriate and helpful" test to require (1)
a proximate relationship between the home office and the taxpayer's
77. Although Bodzin received some "expedite" cases which had to be completed in
a short period of time, such cases were relatively few and he had effective control over
his own schedule. Id. at 823.
78. Bodzin customarily traveled the ten miles to and from work in a car pool. He
chose to use his home office because it enabled him to make better use of his car pool
and to spend more time with his family. Id.
79. The taxpayer's total rent per year was $2,100 for an apartment consisting of
a living room, dining room, kitchen, two bedrooms, two bathrooms, and a study. Of
this amount, he deducted only $100 for the expenses of his home office. Id. at 823-24.
80. Id. at 825. See Richard Keith Thomas, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 72,192, at
985 (1972).
81. 38 T.C. at 186. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
82. 60 T.C. at 826. To block Bodzin's deduction, the Commissioner attempted
to rehabilitate Revenue Ruling 62-180 by interpreting the term "required as a condition
of employment" to mean required in order to "properly perform employment duties."
Id. at 825. Although this requirement was very similar to both the implied condition
of employment test and the increased employee efficiency test, which had been accepted
by the courts in earlier cases, the Service's argument failed. The court criticized this
argument because "'required' can be interpreted strictly as meaning 'absolutely essen-
tial' or 'absolutely necessary,' and such an interpretation leads to the imposition of a
standard which is too strict." Id.
83. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
84. The distance between Bodzin's home and the office, coupled with his use of
a car pool, might support a finding that working at home was more efficient. See note
78 supra. Also, the taxpayer's desire to work overtime in order to "perform to the
best of his ability" might support a finding that use of his home office promoted the
quality of his work. 60 T.C. at 822.
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business, 85 and (2) the taxpayer's good faith in taking the deduc-
tion. s8
Although liberalizing the office-at-home deduction has the ad-
vantage of providing more equal tax treatment between employees and
self-employed individuals,8 7 the approach puts the Service at a handi-
cap. The Bodzin standard presents a very nebulous distinction be-
tween personal and business expenses. Conceptually, it is weak be-
cause in many cases an office-at-home expense is too much like a per-
sonal expense even if it is not unlike a business expense.
Recognizing the inability of the "appropriate and helpful" test to
separate these "look-alike" expenses into their business and personal
components, four judges dissented in Bodzin.5 They were particu-
larly concerned that the majority opinion would open up the deduc-
tion to almost every professional or business person, since the majority
of such persons do professional reading and writing at home.8 9 Two
of the dissenting judges specifically noted Fausner and suggested that
85. Id. at 826. The proximate relationship criterion has been applied in other in-
terpretations of the ordinary and necessary requirement of section 162. See Boehm,
"Ordinary and Necessary" Expenses: Proximate Relationship as a Rejuvenated Test for
Deductibility, 30 U. CIN. L. Rnv. 1 (1966).
86. 60 T.C. at 826. Something more than personal convenience must be shown
before the deduction will be allowed. Id. Although the court failed to specify
the necessary added ingredient, the taxpayer will probably have to show the office ac-
tually helps him better perform his employment duties. The Bodzin court seemed to
recognize that a taxpayer ought to be able to perform the duties of his business in the
best possible manner, and if this includes maintaining an office-at-home, this deduction
should not be disallowed.
87. The self-employed individual, under the earlier tests, had more flexibility in
saying what his work required. Until Bodzin the employee was limited by the condi-
tions that his employer would set. See Frank P. Sylos, 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. If
66,151 (1966) (a self-employed commercial artist who had previously used a kitchen
table for work at home allowed a deduction for the expense of a den which had been
enlarged into a studio specifically for use as a home office).
88. The four dissenting judges expressed their views in three separate opinions. 60
T.C. at 827-29.
89. Id. The mere fact that a lawyer decides to use his home to do some of his
professional reading and some written work for his employer should not operate to
transform part of the personal expense of home rental into a business expense. Id.
If the Bodzin approach is construed broadly, any taxpayer sufficiently interested in his
work to do some at home would be able to deduct a portion of his residential expense
from gross income.
Two commentators have approved the "appropriate and helpful" test set out by
Bodzin. See Comment, Trends in the Home Office Deduction, 42 U. CIN. L. REv.
741, 748-49 (1973); Note, The Employee's Home Office Deduction: The Problem of
Duplicative Facilities, 72 MIcH. L. REv. 348, 354-57 (1973). However, neither writer
recognized the inability of this minimal standard to separate the business from the per-
sonal aspects of the same expense. See note 92 infra and accompanying text.
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its reasoning would preclude any deduction for Bodzin unless he
proved that he would not have rented the room but for his business
use.90 A taxpayer should not be allowed a deduction for an expense
admittedly related to his business if he would have incurred all of the
expense regardless of business exigencies; 91 Fausner demands at least
this much.
Application of the Proposed Additional Expense Test
Although the "appropriate and helpful" standard of Bodzin may
be useful to determine the proximate relationship of the mixed expense
to the taxpayer's business, the proposed additional expense test is nec-
essary in order to isolate the bona fide business purpose component of
the expenditure from any personal aspects of the same expense.92
1. The But For Test. In the commuting area, the taxpayer can
prove the existence of a deductible expense if he can show that he
would not have driven a private automobile to work but for the need
to transport job-related incidentals. 93 In the office-at-home context,
the taxpayer could prove the existence of additional deductible ex-
penses if he could show that he would not have rented the same size
apartment or purchased the same size house but for the need to ac-
quire home office space.94  Under these circumstances, a taxpayer
90. 60 T.C. at 827-29. Judges Featherston and Quealy seem to read Fausner as
standing for a strict but for test. This interpretation has been seconded by at least
one commentator. Comment, supra note 89, at 748. However, given the additional
expense language of the decision, it is doubtful that the Court intended to restrict de-
ductions to the limited but for situation. See notes 98-99 infra and accompanying text.
91. Support for this proposition is found in the Tax Court's "Sutter rule," regard-
ing the nondeductibility of a taxpayer's portion of a business meal to the extent of
his normal food expense for the meal. See note 138 infra.
92. In most business deduction cases, courts customarily defer to the taxpayer's
business judgment by applying the minimal "appropriate and helpful" standard. This
is because "[niormally a taxpayer will not incur an expenditure unless required or jus-
tified by the needs of the business. Proceeding on that logical assumption, the courts
are slow to override the taxpayer's judgment as to the necessity for incurring the expen-
diture." 4A J. MERTENS § 25.09, at 46. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Pacific Mills, 207
F.2d 177 (1st Cu-. 1953). But this deference to taxpayer judgment would not seem
justified in the office-at-home context, unless the taxpayer actually makes an extra ex-
penditure on a room exclusively for the benefit of his business use. If this is not the
case, then the room is appropriate and helpful to the taxpayer's business only in the
same sense that such accepted personal expenses as food and clothing are appropriate
and helpful.
93. See Arnold T. Anderson, 55 T.C. 761 (1971); Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 CuM.
BULL. 34. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
94. For example, under this standard the consultant living in a small one room
apartment who does substantial work at home would not get any rent deduction.
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should be able to deduct the total expense of the extra room95 including
depreciation96 and all utility and furnishing expenses, except those di-
rectly attributable to time spent in this room for personal reasons. 97
2. The Even If Test. Fausner does not stand for a strict but for
rule; rather, the Supreme Court presumably would have allowed a par-
tial deduction even if Fausner would have commuted by car irrespec-
tive of his need to transport his tools, if an allocation of costs be-
tween the personal expenses and the additional business expenses had
been feasible.98  The proposed test merely adopts the analysis sug-
gested by Fausner in the even if situation. Therefore, a taxpayer, who
would have acquired an extra room for personal reasons, would be al-
lowed to prove and deduct any extra utility and furnishing expenses
due to his business use of the room. For example, if Bodzin would
have rented the extra room without considering the needs of his pro-
fessional work-to use as a personal library or guest room-any book-
shelves used exclusively for tax materials, his desk, his chair, desk lamp,
and electricity and heating costs attributable to the time spent for busi-
ness use could be deducted.9 9 Bodzin, in this situation, could not de-
duct rent, which would usually be the greatest percentage of the ex-
pense, for unless the but for test is met, he could not claim that any ad-
ditional rental payments were dictated by his business purpose.
95. This is in conflict with the method of allocation presently accepted by the
courts, which requires the taxpayer to allocate the rent or depreciation-as well as util-
ity and furnishing expenses-between time spent in the room for business purposes and
time spent for personal use. See, e.g., George W. Gino, 60 T.C. 304 (1973); Interna-
tional Artists, Ltd., 55 T.C. 94 (1970). See also Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 Ctum. BULL.
52. However, it seems inappropriate to allocate rent or depreciation when the but for
test has been met because the taxpayer has proved that he would not have incurred
any of that particular expense absent the business purpose.
96. The taxpayer may depreciate the adjusted basis of the part of his home used
for business. Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 CuM. BuLL. 52. The basis of property converted
to business use is the adjusted basis or fair market value on the date of conversion,
whichever is lower. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(g)-i (1964).
97. The entire rent and depreciation in this but for situation would be an expense
in addition to the amount that the taxpayer would otherwise have expended. This is
because the rental or construction costs of an extra room are an all-or-nothing proposi-
tion. The additional deductible utility expenses, on the other hand, would be a func-
tion of the percentage of time spent in the room on business activities.
98. See 413 U.S. at 839.
99. Rent, light, taxes, insurance, and interest on mortgages are among the items
deductible. Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 CuM. BuLL. 52. The ruling does not specifically
mention furnishings in either the text or the examples, but there is no reason to pre-
sume that expenses attributable to the business use of fixtures should not be equally
deductible. Their purchase price, of course, would not be immediately deductible;
rather they would be treated as capital assets and depreciation allowed for exhaustion,
wear, and tear. See Beaudry v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1945).
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3. The Presumption. Although, in theory, the additional expense
test can fairly accurately reflect the business and personal elements of
mixed expenditures, the practical problems of proof in the home of-
fice area can be very difficult. The difficulty involved in reviewing
and resolving the competing personal and business motives of taxpay-
ers who claim home office deductions are considerable. When the tax-
payer uses a room for both personal and business reasons, how does he
prove that the business purpose mandated the extra expense? How
does he prove that the purely personal purpose of having an extra guest
room, library, or den is not great enough to have motivated the addi.
tional expense absent the business use? It may be that the personal
calculus hidden in the taxpayer's mind determined that neither purpose
alone was enough to warrant the expense, but both together made it
worthwhile.
These complex problems of proof show the need for a standard
guideline upon which the taxpayer can rely for a presumption in favor
of business motivation. In the home office context, if the room is
used more than fifty percent of the time for business purposes, there
would be a presumption that but for the business use the room would
not have been rented or constructed, and a deduction for rent or de-
preciation would be allowed. If business use drops below fifty percent
in a particular year, the presumption would be that the room would
have been obtained primarily for personal purposes, and no deduction
for rent or depreciation would be allowed unless an alternative com-
ponent of the proposed test were met.
Because there may be situations outside of the fifty percent guide-
line where the taxpayer is able to prove a business purpose for the ex-
pense,1"' the more than fifty percent business use test should be consid-
ered a "safe harbor" rather than a rigid prerequisite for the deduc-
tion. If it is impossible for the taxpayer to prove under all the facts
and circumstances that he would not have incurred the expense but for
a business reason, he should be able to rely on the safe harbor provi-
sion for a deduction. Since the fifty percent guideline would only
serve as an alternative to complete proof of additional business expen-
ses, the presumption of business motivation is limited to those ex-
penses actually attributable to the time spent in business use.
The minimal "appropriate and helpful" standard applied by the
Bodzin court' not only conflicts with the reasoning of Fausner but
100. The taxpayer, for example, may be able to meet the but for test of business
purpose even if his business use falls below fifty percent if he can show that the home
office actually was required as a condition of his employment.
101. See notes 75-86 supra and accompanying text.
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also is inconsistent with the legislative policy which distinguishes be-
tween business and personal expenses.' By identifying, as precisely
as possible, the additional expenses attributable to business use of the
home office, the proposed test more closely follows the Supreme Court's
suggestion in Fausner and is consistent with statutory commands.
OTHER MIXED BusINESS-PERSONAL EXPENSES
Transportation Expenses in Combined Business-Pleasure Trips
The transportation expenses incurred in a combined business-
pleasure trip currently receive different tax treatment depending upon
whether the trip is within the United States or is to a foreign country. 10 3
If the trip takes place within the United States, the primary purpose of
the trip will determine the deductibility of the transportation ex-
penses. 04 Where the trip is determined to relate primarily to the tax-
payer's trade or business (for example, where it would not have been
made but for the business purpose), the taxpayer's entire transporta-
tion expenses to and from his destination are deductible even though
some personal activities were conducted upon arrival.10 5 The same
equitable result would be reached under subsections (1) (a) and (2)
(a) of the proposed additional expense test, since any transportation
expenses would clearly be in addition to what the taxpayer would have
otherwise spent. However, if the primary purpose of the trip was
determined to be personal, no deduction should arise since the tax-
payer would not have incurred expenses in excess of his personal trans-
portation costs. 0 6
On the other hand, under Internal Revenue Code section 274(c)
when travel is to a foreign country the taxpayer must arbitrarily al-
locate his transportation expenses between his business and personal
102. See notes 1-4 supra and accompanying text.
103. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b) (1958) with Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4(d)(2)
(1969).
104. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b) (1958). While the primary purpose will depend on
the facts of each case, the amount of time spent on business versus personal activities
"is an important factor" in such a determination. Id. § 1.162-2(b)(2) (emphasis
added).
105. Id. § 1.162-2(b)(1). However, if the trip is primarily personal in nature, no
traveling expenses are deductible. Id. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)-(b) (1958),
where, like transportation expenses, the arguably mixed expense of education is con-
sidered to be either completely personal or completely business-related.
106. However, it is possible that a taxpayer could deduct additional expenses under
steps (1) (b) and (2) (b) of the proposed test even if the trip was primarily of a per-
sonal nature. For example, if a salesman had to pay an extra baggage fee for sample
cases, even though he was primarily traveling on a vacation, he should be able to de-
duct the additional expense.
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endeavors. 10 7  Instead of making an inquiry into the primary purpose
of the trip, foreign travel expenses are currently allocated on a per day
basis.'08 For example, if a taxpayer spends ten days overseas and an
additional five days on vacation, he can deduct only two-thirds of his
transportation expenses. 109 However, Fausner would suggest a change
from the present per day arbitrary allocation of transportation expenses
to the two-step additional expense test. As in the domestic travel
case, a taxpayer who proves that an excursion is dictated by his busi-
ness should be able to deduct his entire transportation expenses since
the travel costs would be in excess of what he otherwise would have
spent. Thus, under the proposed test, only after the taxpayer has
had a chance to deduct his entire additional expenses and failed should
a less accurate standard, such as a per day basis, 10 be used. Failing
to get a complete deduction, however, under subsections (1) (a) and
(2)(a) the taxpayer would get a partial deduction if he spent more
than fifty percent of his time on business.
107. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 274(c) (1) provides:
In General.-In the case of any individual who travels outside the United
States away from home in pursuit of a trade or business or in pursuit of an
activity described in section 212, no deduction shall be allowed under section
162 or section 212 for that portion of the expenses of such travel otherwise
allowable under such section which, under regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary or his delegate, is not allocable to such trade or business or to such ac-
tivity.
108. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4(d)(2) (1969). But see Walter H. Hendrix, Jr., 40 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. V 71,049 (1971), where the Tax Court reached an even more inequitable
result by allowing a complete deduction for the taxpayer's transportation expenses
abroad even though he only spent three of eighty-three days on business, a result that
seems flatly contradictory to the statutory language.
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4(f)(1)(i)-(ii) (1969).
110. The per day basis, as presently used, is objectionable because a number of the
criteria in the regulations used in determining whether a day is devoted to business
or nonbusiness purposes seem unjustifiable. First, transportation days are always con-
sidered business days regardless of the primary purpose of the trip. Treas. Reg. §
1.274-4(d)(2)(i) (1969). Thus, in a case such as Walter H. Hendrix, Jr., 40 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. % 71,049 (1971), even though the taxpayer spent only three days of
an eighty-three day trip on business, his transportation days would be deemed business
days for allocating his transportation expenses. Second, weekends and holidays are au-
tomatically considered business days if the taxpayer conducts some business the follow-
ing week. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4(d) (2) (v) (1969). While such a standard is simple
to administer, it neglects the situation where the taxpayer had the choice whether to
continue his work on the weekend and for personal reasons declined to do so. A better
standard for determining whether a taxpayer's activity on weekends and holidays is of
a personal or business nature would be to expand the concept of "circumstances beyond
his control," which is found in Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4(d) (2) (iv) (1969). For instance,
if it is legally impossible for the taxpayer to conduct his business on the weekend then
his living expenses would automatically be deductible. However, if the taxpayer had
his choice whether to work or not, an inquiry into whether it was reasonable to expect
the taxpayer to work would have to be made.
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Entertainment Expenses
Although for many years the Internal Revenue Code did not ex-
plicitly allow a deduction for business entertainment expenses, these
deductions were routinely taken as "ordinary and necessary" busi-
ness expenses under section 162.111 Since the general statutory re-
quirements did not sufficiently distinguish between personal and busi-
ness expenditures, taxpayers inevitably took deductions in excessive
amounts and deducted personal expenditures in the guise of business
expenses."' The problem of abuse is similar to the difficulty cur-
rently experienced in the home office context where the courts are
applying only the minimal "appropriate and helpful" standard to a
mixed personal-business situation." 3  To remedy the problem in the
entertainment area, the Service appealed to Congress," 4 which re-
sponded by narrowing the scope of the entertainment deduction in the
Revenue Act of 1962.1 5
Section 274,116 which was added to the Internal Revenue Code
111. 4AJ. MERTENS § 25.88.
112. See Emmanuel & Lipoff, Travel and Entertainment: The New World of Sec-
tion 274, 18 TAx L. REv. 487, 488 (1963). If a taxpayer could show that a direct
business benefit was expected to flow from the entertainment, then the expenditure
would be deductible even if some personal benefits were also realized. Johnson v.
United States, 45 F. Supp. 377 (S.D. Cal. 1941); William Auerbacher, 25 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. f 56,218 (1956); Walter 0. Kraft, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 49,159 (1949); Vin-
son v. United States, 34 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1714 (1945). Only if the personal benefits
were found to be primary would the deduction be disallowed. Emily Marx, 18 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 49,014 (1949), aff'd, 179 F.2d 938 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
964 (1950); Home Guar. Abstract Co. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 617 (1947). There
were also great difficulties for the Service in administering these standards due to lax
requirements of proof. See 4A J. MERTENS § 25.100, at 421.
113. See notes 75-91 supra and accompanying text.
114. See Caplin, The Travel and Entertainment Expense Problem, 39 TAXEs 947
(1961).
115. Rev. Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 4, 76 Stat. 960 (1962) (codified at
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 274); see S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 29
(1962); H. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1962). See generally Lipoff, En-
tertainment and Related Expenses Under Legislative Attack, 17 TAX L. REv. 183
(1962).
116. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 274(a):
(1) IN GENERAL-NO deduction otherwise allowable under this chapter
shall be allowed for any item-(A) ACTIVITY.-With respect to an activity which is of a type gen-
erally considered to constitute entertainment . . . unless the tax-
payer establishes that the item was directly related to, or, . . . as-
sociated with, the active conduct of the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness, or
(B) FACILITY.-With respect to a facility used in connection with an
activity referred to in subparagraph (A), unless the taxpayer estab-
lishes that the facility was used primarily for the furtherance of
the taxpayer's trade or business and that the item was directly re-
lated to the active conduct of such trade or business ....
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by the 1962 Act, is a statutory attempt to differentiate between the
personal and business aspects of an entertainment expense by requir-
ing the taxpayer to show more of a proximate relationship between
the expenditure and his trade or business than was required by prior
law."17  In order to obtain a deduction, a taxpayer must meet either
the "directly-related" or "associated with" test prescribed by the Code
and defined by the regulations.118  This statutory scheme is partially
consistent with the additional expense approach. It attempts to de-
termine whether an additional expense has been incurred by identify-
ing whether there was a bona fide business motivation for the expense.
Under the "directly-related" test, there must be a showing that the "prin-
cipal character" of the expense was related to the taxpayer's trade or
business." 9  This is to be judged in light of "all the facts and circum-
stances of the case, ' ' x2° and is similar to a but for inquiry. If the busi-
ness aspect of the expense can be shown to be primary, there is an as-
sumption that but for the business purpose, no expenditure would
have been made, and the entire expense attributable to the taxpayer
and his business associates is deductible.' 2' If the expense is not prin-
117. See H. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1962).
118. 1. "Directly-related" test: The taxpayer must show that:
a. he had more than a general expectation of deriving future income or some
other specific benefit (other than the goodwill of the person entertained)
from the entertainment expenses;
b. he did engage in business during the entertainment period with the person
being entertained; and
c. the principal character or aspect of the combined business and entertain-
ment was the transaction of business. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c) (3)
(1963).
2. "Associated with" test: The taxpayer must show that:
a. there was a clear business purpose in making the expenditure (such as get-
ting new business); and
b. the entertainment directly preceded or followed a substantive and bona
fide business discussion. Id. § 274-2(c) (4).
The Code also provides for several exceptions to these general requirements: (1)
business meals; (2) food and beverages for employees; (3) expenses treated as compen-
sation; (4) reimbursed expenses; (5) recreational expenses for employees; (6) em-
ployees and stockholders meetings; and (7) meetings of business leagues. INT. Rv.
CoDE OF 1954, § 274(e).
119. See note 118 supra.
120. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c) (3) (iii) (1963). To meet this requirement, it is not
necessary that more time be devoted to business than to entertainment. Id.
121. See id. § 1.274-2(c) (3) (iv), limiting the "directly related" deduction to ex-
penses allocable to the taxpayer and persons with whom he is engaged in the active
conduct of business; Id. § 1.274-2(d) (2), which denies an "associated with" deduction
for expenditures allocable to a person who was not closely engaged in a substantial and
bona fide business discussion. Although the regulations would seem to allow a full de-
duction for the expenses attributable to the taxpayer himself in such a mixed personal-
business situation, the Sutter rule, see note 138 infra, would allow only a partial deduc-
tion for expenses based on his own consumption.
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cipally for business purposes, no deduction is allowed. Thus, if a tax-
payer invites a business associate to his country club for the day and
has to pay a flat all day visitor's fee, no part of the fee would be deduc-
tible unless the taxpayer could prove that the activities of the day
were principally business-oriented. However, the additional expense
test would extend the inquiry two steps further: (1) to presume busi-
ness motivation if more than fifty percent of the time were spent in
business discussion, and (2) to allow a deduction to the extent of the
percentage of the fee attributable to the time so spent.
The additional expense inquiry could have no application under
the alternative method of obtaining an entertainment deduction under
the present statute-the "associated with" test. 2 By allowing a deduc-
tion for entertainment that directly precedes or follows a substantive
business discussion, 2 ' Congress seems to recognize that pure enter-
tainment can be a bona fide business expense. In this case, no mixed
expense is involved at all since the business purpose encompasses the
time attributable solely to entertainment as well as the time spent spe-
cifically in business discussions. Inquiry is concerned with whether the
expense directly preceded or followed a substantive business discus-
sion.124
Perhaps the closest analogy to the proposed additional expense
test under present law is found in another type of entertainment deduc-
tion. The taxpayer is given an opportunity to show additional expen-
ses by proving that the "primary use" of an entertainment facility, un-
der all the facts and circumstances, was business-related,'25 therefore
creating an assumption that but for the business purpose he would not
have acquired the facility. Yet even if this test is met, the deduction is
limited to that portion of the expense attributable to the time spent
in actual business use.' 2 6 Under an additional expense analysis, a full
deduction for rent or depreciation should be allowed if the but for test
is met, although utility expenses attributable exclusively to personal use
would be disallowed. The regulations currently in force provide for a
presumption of primary business motivation if the facility is used more
than fifty percent of the time to further the taxpayer's trade or busi-
122. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 274(a)(1)(A). See notes 116 & 118 supra.
123. Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(d) (3) (1963). See note 116 supra.
124. Also, the taxpayer must establish that the "business meeting, negotiation, dis-
cussion, or transaction was substantial in relation to the entertainment." Id. § 1.274-
2(d) (3) (a).
125. Id. § 1.274-2(e) (4) (i).
126. Id. § 1.274-2(a) (2).
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ness,'27 with the deduction again limited to expenses attributable to
actual time spent for business purposes.' 28  In this case, the limited de-
duction is appropriate since the taxpayer could not prove that he was
motivated solely by business purposes and would have to rely on the
presumption's safe harbor. The proposed test would modify the pres-
ent scheme slightly to allow a deduction for the utility expenses di-
rectly attributable to time spent in business use even if the taxpayer
cannot establish primary business use by satisfying the but for test or
by meeting the more than fifty percent time requirement.
These proposed modifications are consistent with the present Code
provisions governing the deductibility of entertainment expenses, and
could be implemented by a revision of the regulations. In the enter-
tainment area, the additional expense test is needed to identify the
business component of the mixed expense more precisely and more con-
sistently. This will result not only in increased fairness to the taxpayer
in the amount of his deduction and his burden of proof, but it will
also prevent certain taxpayers from passing a part of their personal
expenses to the government. 129
Duplicative Living Expenses
Under section 162 (a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, a tax-
payer is allowed to deduct his traveling expenses while away from
home in the pursuit of a trade or business. 8 0 Despite the apparent
personal nature of such expenses, taxpayers in temporary employment
situations"' x or on overnight business trips' 32 have been allowed full de-
127. Id. § 1.274-2(e) (4).
The regulations provide that the number of days of business use (which include
any day during which the facility was used for a bona fide business discussion) are
to be compared with the number of days of actual use (not the number of days avail-
able for use) to meet the more than fifty percent primary use requirement. Id. §
1.274-2 (e) (4) (i).
128. Once the primary use is established, the taxpayer may deduct only that portion
of his expenses (depreciation, rent, utilities, insurance, maintenance, etc.) which is "di-
rectly related" to the active conduct of his trade or business. Although "associated
with" expenses are considered to determine fifty percent use, the portion of expenses
attributable to associated expenses is not deductible. Id. § 1.274-2(a)(2).
129. For entertainment activities, the proposed test would allow the taxpayer a par-
tial deduction under either the even if test or the presumption's safe harbor if he could
not meet the difficult but for burden of proof. For entertainment facilities, the test
would allow the taxpayer a full deduction (rather than a percentage) if he meets the
but for test, and a partial deduction under the even if test (rather than no deduction).
However, expenses allocable exclusively to personal use would be one hundred percent
nondeductible.
130. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) (2).
131. When a person accepts a temporary job, generally a year or less, he is allowed
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ductions for the following expenses: meals and lodging (both en
route and at the destination), cleaning and laundry expenses, telephone
and telegraph charges, and certain commuting expenses (to and from
the hotel and place of work; and to and from the railroad station or
airport).1 3' The purpose of allowing such deductions is to ease the
burden of the taxpayer whose business travels require additional and
duplicative living expenses. 131
Since the suggestion in Fausner limits deductions to additional ex-
penditures attributable to the taxpayer's business, the present full de-
duction may be questioned to the extent that living expenses are not
actually duplicated. 3 5  For example, where lodging expenses are not
duplicated, such as when the taxpayer stays with friends or sublets his
apartment, additional, business-related expenses have not been in-
curred and hence no deduction should arise. Likewise, a total deduc-
tion for meals is inconsistent with the analysis suggested in Fausner,
since the taxpayer would have incurred some personal expense for meals
if he had remained at home.'36 For example, if a traveling taxpayer
spends fifteen dollars a day on meals when he normally would have
spent five dollars a day at home, then he should be permitted to de-
duct ten dollars a day as a business-related expense. 137  The Treasury
to deduct his transportation and living expenses incurred in performing that job while
away from home. See, e.g., Harvey v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1960);
Barnhill v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1945); Arthur Sansone, 41 T.C. 277
(1963).
A similar deduction is allowed for the cost of a business luncheon or dinner with
a client. For both the taxpayer's and his client's meal expenses to be deductible, the
taxpayer would have to show that any expenditure for food and beverage was furnished
under circumstances conducive to a business discussion. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(f)
(2) (i) (1963). See also Huffaker & Hulce, What May Be Done to Salvage a Deduc-
tion for Meals on One-Day Trips, 28 1. TAX. 88, 89 (1968).
132. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
133. See 1 CCH 1974 STAn. FPD. TAx REP. I 1350.022.
134. See, e.g., Ronald D. Kroll, 49 T.C. 557, 562 (1968).
135. See James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204, 206-07 (9th Cir. 1962). See also
Comment, Living Expenses While "Away From Home": Business or Personal?, 19 U.
Cm. L. REv. 534, 546 (1952).
The existence of this windfall was a reason the Supreme Court in United States
v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967), interpreted the phrase "away from home" of section
162 only to apply if the taxpayer was away "overnight." Id. at 302. However, this
standard is inconsistent with Fausner since it is possible that additional expenses, such
as increased meal expenses during the day, occur even though the taxpayer is not away
"overnight."
136. Similarly, only infrequently would any cleaning and laundry expenses reflect
anything but the personal expenses the taxpayer would have incurred anyway. How-
ever, such additional expenses might occur if the taxpayer had to get his clothing
cleaned more frequently or at a higher cost than normal.
137. This method of pro-rating the personal and business portions of such meals was
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Department, however, decided that such a determination of the excess
duplicative living expenses would be administratively infeasible and
convinced Congress to grant a deduction for the "entire amount" of
such expenditures 381 While the determination of the excess expense
could be difficult,1 3 9 an administratively feasible calculation is arguably
possible. In making such a determination, since the taxpayer's away-
from-home expenses would have to be determined in any event, the
feasibility of an allocation would depend upon the ease of calculating
the taxpayer's daily meal expenses at home. In this regard, the tax-
payer's daily meal expense at home could be shown by ascertaining the
taxpayer's yearly food expenses and dividing by the number of days
he was at home.1 40
CONCLUSION
The equitable handling of mixed business and personal expenses
first adopted in the now defunct article 292 of Treasury Regulation 45, 3 CuM. BULL.
191 (1920) which provided:
Traveling expenses, as ordinarily understood, include railroad fares and meals
and lodging. If the trip is undertaken for other than business purposes, such
railroad fares are personal expenses and such meals and lodging are living ex-
penses. If the trip is on business, the reasonable and necessary traveling ex-
penses, including railroad fares, and meals and lodging in an amount in excess
of any expenditures ordinarily required for such purposes when at home, be-
come business instead of personal expenses.
Initially, the Bureau of Internal Revenue had held that meals and lodging during
such trips were not deductible. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 292, 1 CuM. BuLL. 161 (1919).
138. See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 301 n.6 (1967).
This pattern of shifting from a deduction only for the "excess" amounts spent to
a full deduction has also emerged in the handling of the personal portion of entertain-
ment meals. In Sutter v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 170 (1953), acquiesced in, 1954-1
CuM. BuL. 6, the Tax Court presented a strict rule allowing only excess meal ex-
penses to be deductible. Subsequently, the Treasury Department stated that it would
apply the Sutter rule only in cases of abuse. T.M.M. 63-10, Rev. Rul. 63-144, 1963-2
CuM. BuLL. 129, 135 (Question and Answer 31).
139. In applying the Fausner rationale, one consideration would be the difficulty of
proving the "excess" meal expenses. Cf. Commissioner v. Bagley, 374 F.2d 204, 206
(1st Cir. 1967). It is important to note that if a calculation of the excess can rea-
sonably be done, both standards would suggest a full deduction of the excess.
In Bagley the reason stated for the conclusion that these difficulties were so oner-
ous was the statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, a tax advisor to the Treasury Department.
See Hearings on H.R. 8245 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Finance, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. 50,234 (1921). However, on closer examination, the problems in mak-
ing such a calculation are never discussed, but just described as "cumbersome" and
"troublesome." Id. at 50,235.
140. This would entail the same type of detailed record-keeping as is required in
other deductible expenses, such as medical costs. Most families do not routinely keep
such records. To implement this approach, the burden of proof would have to be
placed on the taxpayer by the presumption that no additional expenses exist unless
proven. Further, if necessary, a reasonable approximation could be used in determining
a taxpayer's daily at home meal expenses, perhaps using the Bureau of Labor Statistics'
"Market Basket" figures.
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in an administratively feasible framework is a difficult problem to re-
solve. In Fausner, the Supreme Court may have signaled that it will
take a more severe attitude towards the deduction of any portion of an
alleged mixed business and personal expense. However, the "addi-
tional expens&' language of Fausner is not generally applicable, and a
strict application of that language would result in an upheaval in the
tax law. On the other hand, this result need not follow because, as
this Note has demonstrated, it is possible to fashion a more comprehen-
sive test which has Fausner as its starting point. This test embodies
much of the existing tax law without materially distorting the policies
advanced in Fausner. It could be used to bring greater consistency
to the interpretation of section 162 "ordinary and necessary" business
expenses in the inherently difficult factual situations of mixed expenses.
In addition, the test can provide a better balance between the con-
gressional mandate to tax an individual only on his net income and the
need of the government to prevent widespread deduction of expenses
incurred primarily for personal motivations. The possibility for achiev-
ing -this reform has been presented by Fausner; the sound principles
suggested by this decision should provide a starting point for the im-
provement of the tax system.
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